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Abstract
To examine the role of shipping rms in the international research and development
(R&D) rivalry, we build a two-country (exporting and importing), two-rm (exporting and
local) duopoly model with a shipping rm. The exporting rm competes with the local rm
in the duopoly market of the local country but must pay a shipping fee to the shipping rm
in order to sell its product in the local market. Similar to market competition, exporting and
local rms engage in R&D competition. We compare two timing structures of the game: in
one, the R&D stage is rst, and in the other, the shipping rm is the leader. We show that
when the R&D stage is rst, there are ranges of parameter values such that the investment
level of the exporting rm decreases as R&D becomes more ecient. When the shipping
rm is the leader, we show that there are ranges of parameter values such that the prot of
the local rm decreases as R&D becomes more ecient. Further, it is shown that consumers
in the local country prefer the regime in which the shipping rm is the leader, whereas the
government of the local country prefers the other regime.
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1 Introduction
Strategic research and development (R&D) investment has been widely discussed in the liter-
ature on international trade. Following the seminal work of Spencer and Brander (1983), for
example, Leahy and Neary (1996, 1999), Muniagurria and Singh (1997), Qiu and Tao (1998),
Dewit and Leahy (2004, 2011), Kujal and Ruiz (2007, 2009), and Takauchi (2011) focus on the
eects of R&D subsidy policy, the spillover eects of investment, trade liberalization eects on
rms' investment strategy and welfare, and the interactions between other trade policies and
rms' R&D incentives in oligopolistic markets.1
However, the literature ignores one important factor on international trade: the role of ship-
ment.2 In fact, since producers and shippers are not necessarily the same, we must distinguish
between producers and shippers for more a realistic consideration of international competi-
tion with R&D.3 If a shipping fee is determined by a shipping rm, how is the international
R&D rivalry between exporting and domestic rms aected? In other words, compared with a
traditional result, does the nature of the output and the investment strategies of rms change?
To answer this question, in the present paper, we consider a model of international R&D
rivalry with a shipping rm. There are two producers, exporting and local rms, and a non-
producer, a shipping rm. Local and exporting rms compete a la Cournot in the market of
the local country and engage in R&D activity, whereas the shipping rm carries the product
produced by the exporting rm from the exporting country to the market of the local country.
In this situation, we examine two dierent timing games: in the rst, the R&D investment level
is rst chosen by the exporting and local rms; in the second, the shipping rm is the leader.
In cost-reducing R&D competition, it may be expected that if the eciency of R&D improves
(or a cost parameter of R&D decreases), rms have larger incentives to invest, the volume of
R&D investment increases, and output and prot increase. Because the eciency of R&D
directly aects the volumes of investment and output, it has an important role. However, we
found some paradoxical results when R&D is highly ecient. First, we show that when the
R&D stage is rst, the volume of R&D investment of the exporting rm is inverted-U shaped
1There are other topics on international R&D rivalry that focus on rm heterogeneity. Assuming the R&D
investment level of rm has no eect on the rival's output choice and introducing a distribution function of
cost, Long et al. (2011) examine trade liberalization eects with and without free entry in an oligopoly model.
Their non-strategic R&D model is similar to the study of Haaland and Kind (2008), which assumes that each
rm simultaneously chooses both R&D investment and output. Furthermore, although they do not consider
international competition, there are recent works that focus on cost heterogeneity. Ishida et al. (2011) examine
the relationship between rms' competitive position and initial cost dierences among rms.
2In international trade theory, there are studies that focus on transportation services. Francois and Wooton
(2001) consider shipping industry in a general equilibrium setting. Andriamananjara (2004) examines the reduc-
tion of trade barriers in a two-way oligopoly model with the shipping industry. However, these studies do not
consider rms' R&D activity.
3For example, a famous shipping rm in Japan, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, provides car carriers, container ships, and
logistics from Japan overseas. See their web site: http://www.mol.co.jp/menu-e.html. Additionally, Mitsubishi
Souko provides marine transportation by ship; this service is used by Mitsubishi Motors Company. See their web
site: http://www.mitsubishi-logistics.co.jp/service/index.html (in Japanese).
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for the eciency of R&D: if R&D is highly ecient, the exporter's investment level decreases as
the eciency of R&D improves. The key to this result is that the shipping fee decreases as the
volume of the exporting rm's investment decreases. For that reason, to reduce the shipping
fee, the exporting rm commits to a smaller level of investment. Since this commitment also
increases the rival's investment level, the exporter's investment level decreases when the rival
has extremely larger incentives to invest.
Second, we show that when the shipping rm is the leader, the local rm's prot is inverted-
U shaped for the eciency of R&D: if R&D investment is highly ecient, the prot of the
local rm decreases as the eciency of R&D improves. In this case, the local rm invests
excessively given its much smaller increase in output. Since an increase in expenditure level in
R&D dominates an increase in gains of investment, the local rm's prot falls.
Third, we show that in the case that R&D investment level is rst decided, the shipping
fee is always higher than in the other case. This is because in the case that fee-setting is rst
decided, for fear of a disadvantage to the exporting rm, the shipping rm always oers a
relatively low fee. As a result, in the case that R&D investment level is rst decided, the prot
of the exporting rm is smaller than in other case, but the local rm has a larger prot in this
case.
Last, we demonstrate that consumers in the local country prefer the case that the shipping
rm is the leader, whereas the government of the local country prefers the case that R&D
investment is rst decided. Commitment to a smaller investment level gives a larger benet
to the rival rm (the local rm), but this does not cover the losses in total outputs of two
manufacturing rms. Therefore, in the case that the shipping rm is the leader, total output is
relatively large, whereas the prot of local rm is relatively large in the other case.
The role of a shipping rm in an international oligopoly is inspired by the work of Lahiri
and Ono (1999). They examine how a traditional argument on optimal tari policy can be
altered when the producer and seller dier. To an international oligopoly model, they introduce
a middleman, called as \seller," and demonstrate that the optimal policy is an import subsidy
(i.e., a negative tari rate) if the seller is the leader. Also they found that the sign of the
optimal tari rate depends on the shapes of production cost and market structures. Although
their focus is on the tari policy, in view of the presence of a middleman, our study is related
to theirs, although R&D rivalry was not considered in their work.
Our study is also related to some works on labor unions with oligopolies (e.g., Calabuig and
Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002; Haucap and Wey, 2004; and Manasakis and Petrakis, 2009). In our
model, the shipping rm sets the fee in a manner similar to that employed in the above labor
union model. Manasakis and Petrakis (2004) consider a cost-reducing R&D rivalry with a labor
union and examine the formation of research joint ventures (RJVs) in duopoly rms.
2
However, our model is crucially dierent from the above labor union model.4 In the above
studies, it is assumed that each rm has a union (i.e., a decentralized regime) or that all rms
have a common union (i.e., a centralized regime). In our R&D competition model with a
shipping rm, the only exporting rm must use the shipping rm and pays a fee. This point,
that \one rm has a middleman but the other does not," is basically dierent from the above
unionized industry model.5
In the next section, we build a model and examine rms' investment and output strategies.
Section 3 compares outcomes and examines welfare implications. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a two-country partial equilibrium trade model with a shipping rm. There are two
countries, local and foreign. The local country has a product market, but the foreign country
does not have. We call the foreign an \exporting" country. Three rms|an exporting rm,
a local rm, and a shipping rm|exist in the world, and the exporting (resp. local) rm
locates in the exporting (resp. local) country. Exporting and local rms are manufacturers of a
product and compete a la Cournot in the local country's market. Since the local rm is local,
we assume that this rm supplies its product without a shipping fee. On the other hand, since
the exporting rm is located overseas, it must use the shipping rm in order to carry its product
to the local market across international borders. To transport the product, the exporting rm
must pay a shipping fee, f , to the shipping rm.
Before market competition, exporting and local rms engage in cost-reducing R&D compe-
tition without spillover. The unit production cost is c (> 0), and is the same between exporting
and local rms. To reduce the initial unit cost, both manufacturing rms make cost-reducing
investments. After investment, the unit cost becomes c  xi, where xi is the investment level of
manufacturing rm i. Variables associated with the two manufacturing rms are subscripted
by i = E;L (exporting and local). We assume that the R&D cost function is linear-quadratic:
(=2)(xi)
2, where  is the eciency of R&D and a positive constant.6 That is, a smaller 
corresponds to a higher eciency in R&D.
A representative consumers' utility function in the local country is U = z + aQ  (1=2)Q2,
4Although Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) and Haucap and Wey (2004) consider a unionized industry,
they do not examine R&D rivalry. In addition, there are other works on the unionized industry model. Lommerud
et al. (2003) discuss a rm's choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) with a labor union in
a two-way oligopoly model. However, they do not consider R&D activity.
5Our model also diers from Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) on the following point. To examine cooperative
R&D regimes (RJVs), they focus on the role of spillover eects of investment, but ignore the cost parameter of
R&D. In contrast to Manasakis and Petrakis (2009), we focus on the role of the cost parameter of R&D, but do
not consider the spillover eects of investment.
6This linear-quadratic R&D cost function is popular, and many studies employ it. See Leahy and Neary (1996,
1999), Qiu and Tao (1998), Dewit and Leahy (2004, 2011), Motta (2004, Ch. 2), Kujal and Ruiz (2009), Ishida
et al. (2011), and Takauchi (2011).
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where z is consumption of the numerare good and Q is the total supply of both manufacturing
rms: Q =
P
i=E;Lqi, where qi is the supply of manufacturing rm i. Hence, the inverse market
demand in local country is p = a   Q, where p is the product price, a is a positive constant,
and a > c. Thus, the prot of each producing rm, i, is given by
E  [a  (qE + qL)  (c  xE)  f ] qE   
2
(xE)
2; (1)
L  [a  (qE + qL)  (c  xL)] qL   
2
(xL)
2: (2)
The shipping rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the exporting rm, and decides the fee,
f . The prot of the shipping rm, S , is given by
S  (f   f0) qE ; (3)
where f0 is the minimum price of shipment. For simplicity, we normalize f0 to zero.
To examine the strategic interaction between the shipping rm and the manufacturing rms,
we consider two scenarios on the timing structures of the game. In the rst, manufacturing rms'
R&D stage is rst, and in the other, the shipping rm's fee-setting stage is rst (i.e., the shipping
rm is the leader). In general, since investment decisions do not have the exibility of other
production decisions, it is plausible that the investment stage will take place in the rst stage of
the game. On the other hand, the shipping rm is a dierent player from manufacturing rms.
For this reason, we must consider these two cases.
In Case 1, the following timing structure is considered. At stage 1, the exporting and local
rms independently and simultaneously choose a volume of R&D investment. At stage 2, the
shipping rm sets the shipping fee. At stage 3, the exporting and local rms compete a la
Cournot in the local market.
In Case 2, the timing structure is as follows. At stage 1, the shipping rm sets shipping fee.
At stage 2, the exporting and local rms independently and simultaneously choose a volume of
R&D investment. At stage 3, the exporting and local rms compete a la Cournot in the local
market.
The game has perfect information. Therefore, we use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
as the equilibrium concept and solve the game using backward induction.
In the next subsection, we calculate the equilibrium outcomes in two timing structures and
examine on rms strategies. We rst consider Case 1.
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2.1 Case 1: The R&D stage is rst
Third stage. The sxporting and local rms compete a la Cournot in the market of the local
country. Using (1) and (2), the FOC for the prot maximization of each rm is
Exporting rm: 0 = a  c  f   2qE   qL + xE ;
Local rm: 0 = a  c  qE   2qL + xL:
The above equations yield the following outputs in the third stage:
qE(xE ; xL; f) =
1
3
(a  c  2f + 2xE   xL); qL(xE ; xL; f) = 1
3
(a  c+ f   xE + 2xL): (4)
Second stage. In the second stage, the shipping rm chooses a level of the shipping fee f .
From (3) and (4), the FOC is
0 =  2
3
f +
1
3
(a  c  2f + 2xE   xL):
Solving the above equation for f , we obtain the shipping fee in the second stage.
f(xE ; xL) =
1
4
(a  c+ 2xE   xL): (5)
Thus, fee rises (falls) as the volume of R&D investment of the exporting rm increases (de-
creases).
In the second stage, from (4) and (5), the outputs of exporting and local rms are
qE(xE ; xL) =
1
6
(a  c+ 2xE   xL); qL(xE ; xL) = 1
12
[5(a  c)  2xE + 7xL]: (6)
First stage. Hereafter, we use \" as the symbol of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
Case 1 of the game. In the rst stage, the exporting and local rms choose their respective
volumes of R&D investment. Using (1), (2), (5), and (6), FOCs in this R&D stage are
Exporting rm: 0 = a  c+ (2  9)xE   xL;
Local rm: 0 = 35(a  c)  14xE + (49  72)xL:
The above equations yield the equilibrium levels of R&D investment xE and x

L (eq. (8), below).
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The equilibrium output and prot of exporting and local rms are
qE =
6(a  c)(6   7)
28  195 + 2162 ; q

L =
6(a  c)(15   4)
28  195 + 2162 ; (7)
xE =
4(a  c)(6   7)
28  195 + 2162 ; x

L =
7(a  c)(15   4)
28  195 + 2162 ; and (8)
E =
4(a  c)2(6   7)2(9   2)
(28  195 + 2162)2 ; 

L =
(a  c)2(15   4)2(72   49)
2(28  195 + 2162)2 : (9)
The equilibrium shipping fee is
f =
9(a  c)(6   7)
28  195 + 2162 : (10)
From (3), (7), and (10), the equilibrium prot of the shipping rm is
S =
54(a  c)22(6   7)2
(28  195 + 2162)2 : (11)
Throughout the analysis, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The eciency of R&D is not too high, i.e.,  > 4=3 ' 1:3333.
To ensure positive quantities for all outcomes in the two cases of the game, we require the above
assumption. Note that this is a stronger condition on  than the condition required to satisfy
the SOCs in both the R&D and fee-setting stages of the two timing structures.7 Thus, any
other conditions are satised as long as Assumption 1 holds.
Eqs. (7){(9) yield the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In Case 1, (i) when R&D is highly ecient, the volume of R&D investment
of the exporting rm decreases as the eciency of R&D improves; otherwise it increases as
the eciency of R&D improves, i.e., @xE=@ > 0 if  < b  (1=12)(3p7 + 14) ' 1:8281 but
@xE=@ < 0 if  > b. However, the volume of R&D investment of the local rm increases as
the eciency of R&D improves. (ii) The output and prot of the exporting rm decrease, but
those of the local rm increase as the eciency of R&D improves.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In a usual cost-reducing R&D competition, the volume of investment increases as R&D
improves (a decrease in the cost parameter of R&D).8 Thus, one might think that the result
shown in Proposition 1 is in sharp contrast to the intuition. When R&D is highly ecient, why
7In case 1, the SOC for prot maximization in the R&D stage is  > 2=9 ' 0:22222 for the exporting rm
and  > 49=72 ' 0:680556 for the local rm.
8For example, see Motta (2004, Ch. 2).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium investment level of both producing rms in Case 1
dose the exporting rm reduce the volume of investment as the eciency of R&D improves?
The logic behind this result depends on two factors. The rst is that the economy of scale
works in R&D investment; the eect is stronger if R&D is highly ecient. The second is that
to commit to a smaller level of investment reduces the shipping fee, which decreases as the
exporting rm's investment level decreases.
In investment, each rm will invest heavily if it believes it can sell heavily. Furthermore,
since a smaller  corresponds to a higher R&D eciency, investment incentives are larger. The
exporting rm must pay the shipping fee, so it has a smaller market share than the local rm.
That is, since the local rm has an advantage in market competition, the local rm invests
actively if  is suciently small.
The second factor promotes the eects of the scale economy. Since an investment level
is decided in the rst stage of the game, the exporting rm can control the shipping fee. A
reduction in xE , from eq. (5), directly reduces the shipping fee and increases the rival's in-
vestment level (i.e., strategic substitutes in the R&D stage). Additionally, from eq. (5), an
increase in the rival's investment level also reduces the fee. To reduce the shipping fee, the
exporting rm always commits to a smaller level of investment; this behavior induces a larger
level of investment by the rival. When the eciency of R&D is suciently high, the eects of
smaller investment extremely increase the rival's investment and further reduces the investment
level of the exporting rm. Therefore, if  becomes smaller than the critical level, b, then the
investment level of the exporting rm falls.
2.2 Case 2: The shipping rm is the leader
Note that in Case 2, the shipping fee is decided in the rst stage of the game. Since the third
stage (market stage) is the same as Case 1, we start the analysis from the second stage.
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Second stage. In the second stage, each producing rm engages in R&D investment. Thus,
each rm's FOC is as follows:9
Exporting rm: 0 =
1
9
[4(a  c)  8f   (9   8)xE   4xL];
Local rm: 0 =
1
9
[4(a  c) + 4f   4xE   (9   8)xL]:
Solving the above FOCs for xE and xL, we obtain the investment levels in the second stage.
xE(f) =
4[(a  c)(3   4)  2(3   2)f ]
(3   4)(9   4) ; xL(f) =
4[(a  c)(3   4) + 3f ]
(3   4)(9   4) : (12)
From (12), the outputs of both producing rms in the second stage are
qE(f) =
3[(a  c)(3   4)  2(3   2)f ]
(3   4)(9   4) ; qL(f) =
3[(a  c)(3   4) + 3f ]
(3   4)(9   4) : (13)
First stage. Hereafter, we use \" as the symbol of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
Case 2 of the game. The FOC for the shipping rm is
0 =
3[(a  c)(3   4)  4(3   2)f ]
(3   4)(9   4) :
Thus, solving the above FOC for f , we obtain the equilibrium shipping fee f in Case 2.10
f =
(a  c)(3   4)
4(3   2) : (14)
The equilibrium outcomes in Case 2 are
qE =
3(a  c)
2(9   4) ; q

L =
3(a  c)(15   8)
4(3   2)(9   4) ; (15)
xE =
2(a  c)
9   4 ; x

L =
(a  c)(15   8)
(3   2)(9   4) ; and (16)
E =
(a  c)2(9   8)
4(9   4)2 ; 

L =
(a  c)2(15   8)2(9   8)
16(3   2)2(9   4)2 : (17)
The equilibrium prot of the shipping rm is
S =
3(a  c)2(3   4)
8(3   2)(9   4) : (18)
9The SOC for both producing rms in R&D stage is  > 8=9 ' 0:888889.
10The SOC for the shipping rm is @2S=@f
2 =  12(3   2)=[(3   4)(9   4)]. Hence, the SOC holds as
long as Assumption 1 holds.
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Before the analysis on the outcomes of the two producing rms, let us compare the equilib-
rium shipping fees in the two cases. From (10), (11), (14), and (18), we establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Regardless of the timing structures, (i) the shipping fee rises and becomes to
(1=4)(a c) as the eciency of R&D becomes worse; (ii) the prot of the shipping rm decreases
as the eciency of R&D improves.
Proof. (i) Dierentiating (10) and (14) with respect to , we obtain
@f
@
=
18(a  c)( 98 + 168 + 1712)
(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
@f
@
=
3(a  c)
2(3   2)2 > 0:
From the numerator of @f=@,  98 + 168 + 1712  0 for all   (7=57)(3p6   4) '
0:411216. Hence, @f=@ > 0. Further, rearranging (10) and (14), we nd that lim!1 f =
lim!1
(a c)(54 (63=))
(28=2) (195=)+216 = (1=4)(a  c) = lim!1 f = lim!1 (a c)(3 (4=))4(3 (2=)) .
(ii) Dierentiating (11) with respect to , we obtain
@S
@
=
216(a  c)2(6   7)( 98 + 168 + 1712)
(28  195 + 2162)3 ;
@S
@
=
3(a  c)2( 16 + 24 + 92)
4(3   2)2(9   4)2 :
From the above argument, @S=@ > 0. From the numerator of @

S =@,  16+ 24 +92 > 0
for all  > (4=3)(
p
2  1) ' 0:552285. Q.E.D.
In our model, exporting and shipping rms have a certain \cooperative relationship." Since
a shipping rm's prot directly depends on the volume of output of the exporting rm, to ensure
positive production for the exporting rm, the shipping rm reduces its fee when the exporting
rm is extremely weak. Hence, the prot of shipping rm also goes down as the output of the
exporting rm goes down. This logic holds in both cases.
In a cost-reducing R&D competition, investment is not performed if the cost of R&D in-
creases indenitely (i.e., xi ! 0 as  ! 1). That the shipping fee has an upper limit corre-
sponds to this fact.
From (15){(17), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In Case 2, (i) the output and volume of the R&D investment of local and
exporting rms increases as the eciency of R&D improves. (ii) When R&D is highly ecient,
the prot of the local rm decreases as the eciency of R&D improves; otherwise, it increases
as the eciency of R&D improves, i.e., @L =@ > 0 if  < e ' 1:74008 but @L =@ < 0 if
 > e. However, the prot of the exporting rm increases as the eciency of R&D improves.
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Proof. (i) Dierentiating (15) with respect to , we obtain
@qE
@
=   6(a  c)
(9   4)2 < 0;
@qL
@
=  3(a  c)(32  120 + 117
2)
(9   4)2 :
From the numerator of @qL =@, 32   120 + 1172 = 0 has no real root, and  > 4=3 has a
positive value. Thus, @qL =@ < 0. Dierentiating (16) with respect to , we obtain
@xE
@
=  18(a  c)
(9   4)2 < 0;
@xL
@
=  3(a  c)(40  144 + 135
2)
(3   2)2(9   4)2 :
From the numerator of @xL =@, 40   144 + 1352 = 0 has no real root, and  > 4=3 has a
positive value. Thus, @xL =@ < 0.
(ii) Dierentiating (17) with respect to , we obtain
@E
@
=
8(a  c)2
(9   4)3 > 0;
@L
@
=  (a  c)
2(15   8)( 128 + 528   6842 + 2433)
4(3   2)3(9   4)3 :
From the numerator of @L =@, we nd that  128 + 528   6842 + 2433  0 for   e '
1:74008. Therefore, @L =@  0 for   e and @L =@ > 0 for  < e. Q.E.D
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Figure 2: Inverted-U shaped equilibrium prot of local rm
Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows that the local rm's output and investment are decreasing with
. In Case 2, the shipping fee is decided in the rst stage, so the exporting rm does not directly
control it. For this reason, the equilibrium investment and output levels of the two producing
rms have an ordinal nature with respect to , i.e., @qi =@ < 0 and @x

i =@ < 0, for i = E;L.
On the other hand, an interesting result occurs concerning the prot of local rm: it is
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inverted-U shaped for  (see Panel (b)). That is, if R&D is highly ecient, the local rm's
prot decreases as the eciency of R&D improves.
Similar to Case 1 (Proposition 1), the local rm has a larger incentive to invest because the
local rm has an advantage in market competition. From (15) and (16), we nd the following
relations in Case 2:
xq 
@xL@
  @qL@
 = 9(a  c)[16 + (51   56)]2(3   2)2(9   4)2 > 0; @xq@ < 0:
Thus, the dierence between an increase in investment and an increase in output expands when
R&D becomes more ecient.11
Why does this result occur? As shown in Proposition 2, the shipping fee falls as the eciency
of R&D improves. For this reason, the cost dierence between the exporting and local rms
closes as the eciency of R&D improves. The eect of a closing cost dierence induces an
increase in the output and prot of the exporting rm ((ii) of Proposition 3). Also, in Case 2,
the shipping fee is decided in the rst stage of the game, so the exporting rm cannot commit
to a smaller level of investment to reduce the shipping fee. Thus, corresponding to an increase
in output, the exporting rm increases its investment level if the eciency of R&D improves.
The local rm suers a loss from such behavior by the exporting rm. This is because the
local rm has an advantage in market competition from the beginning, but this advantage
becomes smaller when the shipping fee falls. Therefore, the local rm's output increases, but
the increase in output is relatively smaller than the expenditure level of R&D. The eects of
excessive investment expand as the eciency of R&D improves (@xq=@ < 0). Therefore, if
 becomes smaller than the critical level, e, an increase in the expenditure level of investment
will dominate an increase in gains, and the prot of the local rm decreases.
3 Comparison among Outcomes/Welfare Implications
In this section, we compare welfares in Cases 1 and 2 and examine the relationship between
each country's welfare and the eciency of R&D.
Before the welfare analysis, let us compare the outcomes in Cases 1 and 2. From eqs.
(7){(10) and (14){(17), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Comparison between the outcomes in Case 1 (the R&D stage is rst) and Case
2 (the shipping rm is the leader) yields
11Formally, we obtain
@xq
@
=  9(a  c)( 256 + 1296   2268
2 + 13773)
(3   2)3(9   4)3 < 0 for all  > 4=3:
11
(i) f > f;
(ii) S  S if   S and S < S if  > S, where S ' 1:4273;
(iii) qE > q

E, q

L > q

L , x

E > x

E, x

L > x

L, and the dierence between x

L and x

L is
maximized at  = 0 ' 1:82817; and
(iv) E > 

E and 

L > 

L .
Proof. See Appendix C.
ΓS > 1.4273
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Figure 3: Comparison f and f; S and 

S
Figures 3 and 4 depict investment levels in the local rm (claim (iii)), shipping fees, and
the dierence in the prots of the shipping rm (claims (i) and (ii)). Claim (i) of Proposition
4 indicates that when the shipping fee can directly control the exporting rm's investment
strategy, for fear of a disadvantage to the exporting rm, the shipping rm oers a relatively
lower fee. Thus, this is desirable for the exporting rm when the shipping rm is the leader,
which corresponds to claim (iv), that is, E > 

E .
Intuitively, from claim (i) of Proposition 4, one might think that the shipping rm has a
\second-mover advantage" in our model. However, in contrast to the result of the shipping fee,
the prot of the shipping rm is larger in Case 1 than in Case 2 if R&D is highly ecient. Claim
(ii) relies on claim (iii), that is, on the outputs ranking between the two cases: qE > q

E . Since
the exporting rm's output is relatively small in Case 1 (although the shipping fee is relatively
high in that case), the prot of shipping rm is possibly larger in Case 1 than in Case 2.
Claim (iii) of Proposition 4 has an interesting result. This is because world total investment,
xE + xL, is larger in Case 2 than in Case 1. In particular, x

L > x

L is important. This result
corresponds to claim (ii) of Proposition 3, that is, the local rm invests excessively given its
output.
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Figure 4: Comparison xL and x
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L
Claim (iv) is intuitive one. Since the prot of the producing rm depends on its output,
claim (iv) corresponds to the result of claim (iii). The exporting and local rms' desirable
timing structures are opposite of one another.
Next, we consider welfare and consumer surplus in the local country. The social welfare
of the local country is given by WL  CS +L, where consumer surplus is dened by CS =
(1=2)(qE + qL)
2. Thus, welfare and consumer surplus in the two cases are
CS =
18(a  c)22(21   11)2
(28  195 + 2162)2 ; (19)
CS =
81(a  c)22(7   4)2
32(3   2)2(9   4)2 ; (20)
W L =
(a  c)2( 784 + 11388   362972 + 320763)
2(28  195 + 2162)2 ; (21)
W L =
(a  c)2( 1024 + 6288   124562 + 80193)
32(3   2)2(9   4)2 : (22)
Consumer surplus and welfare in two cases increase as the eciency of R&D improves:
@CS=@ < 0 and @WL=@ < 0 (see Appendix D).
Comparing (19) with (20), we obtain
CS CS =  9(a  c)
22(368  1056 + 7292)( 1040 + 6912   141032 + 90723)
32(3   2)2(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 : (23)
Subsequently, comparing (21) with (22), we obtain
W L  W L =
3(a  c)22A
32(3   2)2(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 ; (24)
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where A  523520  3860736 + 103000322   116251203 + 42216394 + 6298565.
From (23) and (24), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 While consumers in the local country prefer the regime in which the shipping
rm is the leader, the government of the local country prefers the regime in which the R&D
stage is rst.
Proof. From the right hand side of (23), 368 1056+7292 > 0 for all  > (4=243)(p73+44) '
0:864922;  1040 + 6912   141032 + 90723 > 0 for all  > 0:700737. Subsequently from the
right hand side of (24), by numerical calculation, H > 0 for all  > 0:695157. Therefore,
CS > CS and W L > W

L from Assumption 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 implies that either the prot of the local rm or consumer surplus has the
larger eect on the welfare of local country. As shown in (iv) of Proposition 4, the local rm's
prot is larger in Case 1 than in Case 2. However, from Proposition 5, consumer surplus (i.e.,
volume of total output) is larger in Case 2 than in Case 1. Since the national welfare of local
country is the sum of the local rm's prot and consumer surplus, we nd that a gain in the
prot of the local rm in Case 1 dominates a loss in consumer surplus in Case 2. In Case 1, to
reduce the shipping fee, the exporting rm commits to a smaller level of investment (Proposition
1). In Proposition 5, we can also verify that this commitment eect of the exporting rm gives
a larger benet to the local rm.
Finally, we consider the social welfare of the exporting country. Hereafter, we assume that
the shipping rm is located in the exporting country. Then, the social welfare of the exporting
country, WE , is sum of the prots of the shipping and exporting rms, E + S . The social
welfare is given by
W E =
2(a  c)2(6   7)2(45   4)
(28  195 + 2162)2 ; W

E =
(a  c)2(80  228 + 1352)
8(9   4)2(3   2) : (25)
In contrast to the welfare of the local country, the welfare of the exporting country decreases
as the eciency of R&D improves: @WE=@ > 0 (see Appendix D).
Eq. (25) yields the following result.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the shipping rm is located in the exporting country. Then, (i) the
social welfare of the exporting country is larger in Case 2 than in Case 1. (ii) The dierence
between the social welfare of the exporting country in Cases 1 and 2 is maximized at  =  '
1:63951.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As shown in Proposition 4, the prot of the exporting rm is always larger in Case 2 than in
Case 1. On the other hand, if R&D is highly ecient, the prot of the shipping rm is larger in
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Case 1 than in Case 2. At rst glance, welfare appears larger in Case 1 than in Case 2. However,
the welfare level in Case 2 dominates that in Case 1. Whereas the prot of the shipping rm
becomes smaller as the eciency of R&D improves, the prot of the exporting rm in Case 2
increases as the eciency of R&D improves. Therefore, the volume of the shipping rm's prot
where R&D is suciently ecient is too small to reverse the ranking in the exporting rm's
prot in Cases 1 and 2.
4 Conclusion
This paper builds a model of a two-country (exporting and local countries), two-rm (export-
ing and local rms) international R&D rivalry with a shipping rm. Although R&D rivalry
has been broadly discussed in the literature of trade theory, the role of the shipping rm on
industrial competition has received little attention (e.g., Spencer and Brander, 1983; Leahy and
Neary, 1996, 1999; Muniagurria and Singh, 1997; Qiu and Tao, 1998; Dewit and Leahy, 2004,
2011; Kujal and Ruiz, 2007, 2009; Takauchi, 2011). To examine the interaction between the
endogenously decided shipping fee and the producing rm's strategies, we consider dierent two
timing structures of the model. In one, the R&D investment level is rst decided; in the other,
the shipping rm is the leader.
We have shown rst that the exporting rm's investment level is inverted-U shaped for the
eciency of R&D when the R&D investment level is rst decided in the game. That is, there
are ranges of parameter values such that the investment level goes down as the eciency of
R&D improves. This is because the shipping fee decreases as the exporting rm's investment
level decreases, and thus the exporting rm commits to a smaller investment level to reduce
the shipping fee. This behavior leads to an increase in the investment level of the rival rm.
As a result, the exporting rm decreases its investment level when the rival rm has stronger
incentives to invest.
Second, we have shown that the local rm's prot is inverted-U shaped for the eciency
of R&D when the shipping rm is the leader. That is, there are ranges of parameter values
such that prot decreases as the eciency of R&D improves. In this case, the local rm invests
excessively given its output. Since the loss in investment expenditure dominates the investment
gain, the prot of the local rm falls when R&D is highly ecient.
Third, we have shown that in the case that the R&D investment level is rst decided,
the shipping fee is always higher than in the other case. For fear of a disadvantage to the
exporting rm, the shipping rm oers a relatively lower fee if it can control investment level
of the exporting rm. For this reason, in the case that the R&D stage is rst, the prot of the
exporting rm is smaller than in the other case, but local rm has a larger prot.
Last, we have demonstrated that consumers in the local country prefer the regime in which
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the shipping rm is the leader, wheres the government of local country prefers the regime in
which R&D stage is rst. To commit to a smaller investment level gives a larger benet to
the rival rm; this eect does not cover the losses in total output. Therefore, total output
is relatively large when the shipping rm is the leader, whereas the prot of the local rm is
relatively large when R&D stage is rst.
In the cost-reducing R&D rivalry, the eciency of R&D plays an important role. If the cost
of R&D improves, investment incentives and output increase. This undoubtedly increases prot
of rms. However, our ndings highlight some paradoxical results that occur if R&D is highly
ecient. Since all these ndings depend on the behavior of the shipping rm, we believe that
our model developed herein oers new insight on international R&D competition.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Dierentiating (8) with respect to , we obtain
@xE
@
=  36(a  c)(133  336 + 144
2)
(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
@xL
@
=  504(a  c)(5  24 + 45
2)
(28  195 + 2162)2 :
From the numerator of @xE=@, 133   336 + 1442  0 for   (1=12)(3
p
7 + 14) ' 1:8281
and   (1=12)( 3p7 + 14) ' 0:505229. This yields @xE=@  0 if   (1=12)(3
p
7 + 14), but
@xE=@ < 0 if  > (1=12)(3
p
7 + 14). Subsequently, from the numerator of @xL=@, we nd
that 5  24 + 452 > 0 for all . Thus, @xL=@ < 0.
(ii) Dierentiating (7) with respect to , we obtain
@qE
@
=
12(a  c)( 98 + 168 + 1712)
(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
@qL
@
=  6(a  c)(112  840 + 2061
2)
(28  195 + 2162)2 :
From the numerator of @qE=@,  98 + 168 + 1712 > 0 for  > (7=57)(3
p
6  4) ' 0:411216.
Thus, @qE=@ > 0. Subsequently, from the numerator of @q

L=@, we nd that 112   840 +
20612 = 0 has no real root and a positive value. Thus, @qL=@ < 0.
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Dierentiating (9) with respect to , we obtain
@E
@
=
8(a  c)2(6   7)(196  903   3422 + 43743)
(28  195 + 2162)3 ;
@L
@
=  (a  c)
2(15   4)( 5488 + 39648   1372772 + 1380243)
2(28  195 + 2162)3 :
From numerical calculation, we nd that 196   903   3422 + 43743  0 for all   2 '
 0:50553. Thus, @E=@ > 0. Subsequently, from numerical calculation, we nd that  5488+
39648   1372772 + 1380243 > 0 for all  > 3 ' 0:64468. Thus, @L=@ < 0. Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
(i) From (10) and (14), we obtain
f   f = (a  c)(261
2   360 + 112)
4(3   2) (2162   195 + 28) :
Since 2612   360 + 112 > 0 for all  > (4=87)(p22 + 15) ' 0:905306, f > f.
(ii) From (11) and (18), we obtain
S   S =
 3(a  c)2B
8(3   2)(9   4)(28  1952 + 2162)2 ;
where B   3136  10416 + 752042   1075413 + 427684. By numerical calculation, B  0
for   S ' 1:4273 but B > 0 for  > S ' 1:4273.
(iii) From (7) and (15), we obtain
qE   qE =
 9(a  c)(51   28)
2(9   4)(28  195 + 2162) ; q

L   qL =
3(a  c)( 32  60 + 1892)
4(3   2)(9   4)(28  195 + 2162) :
Thus, qE > q

E . Since  32  60+1892 > 0 for all  > (2=63)(
p
193+5) ' 0:59976, qL > qL .
Subsequently, from (8) and (16), we obtain
xE   xE =  
2(a  c)( 28  21 + 1082)
(9   4)(28  195 + 2162) :
Since  28 21+1082 > 0 for all  > (1=72)(p1393+7) ' 0:615596, xE > xE . Subsequently,
we obtain
xL   xL =  
3(a  c)(100  249 + 1352)
(3   2)(9   4)(28  195 + 2162) :
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Since 100  249 + 1352 > 0 for all  > (1=90)(p889 + 83) ' 1:25351, xL > xL.
Subsequently, we have
@(xL   xL )
@
=
3(a  c)C
(3   2)2(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
where C   22400 + 111552 + 1450802   17010003 + 35490154   29043365 + 7873206.
By numerical calculation, C = 0 for  =  ' 1:82817.
(iv) From (9) and (17), we obtain
E  E =
 3(a  c)2D
4(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
where D  6272  58128+1804322  2336853+1049764. By numerical calculation, D > 0
for all  > 1:00598. Thus, E > 

E . Subsequently, we have
L  L =
3(a  c)22F
16(3   2)2(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
where F   312320 + 3532416   147206882 + 290926083   276808594 + 102351605. By
numerical calculation, F > 0 for all  > 0:569386. Thus, L > 

L . Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
(i) From (25), the dierence between W E and W

E yields
W E  W E =
 3(a  c)2G
8(3   2)(9   4)2(28  195 + 2162)2 ;
where G   12544+283584 14650562+31243323 29609554+10147685. By numerical
calculation, G > 0 for all  > 1:193. Thus, W E > W

E .
(ii) Dierentiating W E  W E with respect to , we obtain
@(W E  W E )
@
=
3(a  c)2H
4(3   2)2(9   4)3(28  195 + 2163)3 ;
where H  1404928 50577408+4025064962 11604522243+776394724+75145378325 
195465290136 + 230598154807   132817734728 + 29590634889: By numerical calculation,
we nd that H = 0 has one real root that satises Assumption 1, that is, H = 0 if and only if
 =  ' 1:63951. Q.E.D.
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D. The Eects of  on Welfare
In view of welfare the intuitive results hold on the cost parameter of R&D. From (19){(22), we
obtain the following.
@CS
@
=  36(a  c)
2(21   11)(308  1176 + 17192)
(28  195 + 2162)3 :
Since 308  1176 + 17192 = 0 has no real root and positive values, @CS=@ < 0.
@CS
@
=  81(a  c)
2(7   4)[16 + (51   56)]
8(3   2)3(9   4)3 < 0;
@W L
@
=  (a  c)
2(21952  484848 + 25409162   57508113 + 46694884)
2(28  195 + 2162)3 :
By numerical calculation, since 21952  484848 +25409162  57508113+46694884 > 0 for
all  > 0:573553, @W L=@ < 0.
@W L
@
=  (a  c)
2(2048  17472 + 540002   726843 + 362074)
8(3   2)3(9   4)3 :
By numerical calculation, since 2048   17472 + 540002   726843 + 362074 > 0 for all
 > 0:617807, @W L =@ < 0.
@W E
@
=
8(a  c)2(6   7)(196  3549 + 41942 + 89913)
(28  195 + 2162)3 ;
@W E
@
=
(a  c)2(320  1104 + 8282 + 2433)
4(3   2)2(9   4)3 ;
where 196 3549+41942+89913 > 0 for all  > 0:394337 and 320 1104+8282+2433 > 0
for all  >  4:48568. Thus, @W E=@ > 0 and @W E =@ > 0.
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